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[L A. No. 19448. In Bank. May 2, 1947.]

H. N. ISENBBRG, Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT STABILIZATION COMMISSION et al.,
Appellants,
[la, Ib] Unemployment Insurance - Re1a.tion of Employer and
Employee-Burden of Proof.-In an action by an owner of •
string of horses to recover contributions paid under protest,
in accordance with the Unemployment Insurance Act (Stats.
1935, p. 1226, as amended; 3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8780d),
on the remuneration received by free-lance jockeys performing services for plaintiff, defendant commission does not have
the burden of showing that control was actually exercised by
plaintiff or his trainer over the jockeys.
[2] Usages and Oustoms - Use. - The existence of a contractual '
right may be shown by usages and customs.
'
[8] Unemployment Insurance - Relations of Employer and Em-'
ployee.-One who is an employee within the meaning of Lab.
Code, § 3351 (Workmen's Compensation Act), is engaged in
employment within the meaning of Unemployment Insurance·
Act, § 6.5, the definitions of employment in both statutes being
substantially the same.
;.
[4] lei. - Relation of Employer and Employee - Evidence.-In aD'
action by an owner of a string of horses to recover eontri-·
butions paid under protest on the remuneration received by'
jockeys performing services for plaintiff, evidence of the b";'
lief of the jockeys that they would not be rehired if they
failed to follow instructions of the plaintiff or his trainer i!!
relevant to IIhow their submission to control
:£
[1] See 10 Oal..Tur.10-Yr.Supp. (Pocket Part), "Social Security:'
Mclt. Dig. References: [1, 3-5] Unemployment Insurance; {Sl
i
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[6] Id.-Relation of Employer and Employee-Evidence.-In an
action by an owner of a !'tring of horses to recover contributions paid under protest on the r{'muneration received by
jockcys performing- servjl1c8 fo]' plaintiff. it was error for the
trial ~ourt to holcl that thp jockeys were not employees where,
of the seconclnrv "lements hv which to d('termine the relation,
all were prese;Jt or inappiicable and. 80 far as the right
of control wa~ C(HICernecl. there was no evidence from which
it could reasonably have drawn an~' inference inconsistent
with the conclusion that plaintiff had the right to control the
activities of the jockeys except when he was prevented from
doing so by the rules of the racing board or by the inaccessi.
bility of the jockeys while they were actively engaged in •
race.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of

Los Angeles County. Carl A. Stutsman, Judge. Reversed.
Action to recover unemployment insurance contributions
paid under protest. Judgment for plaintiff reversed.
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn
and Doris H. Maier, Deputy Attorneys General, for Appellants.
John Moore Robinson for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff brought this action pursuant
to scction 45.10 of the California Unemployment Insuralice Act (Stats. 1935, p. 1226, as amended; 3 Deering's
Gcn. Laws, Act 8780d) to recover contributions paid under
protest on the remuneration received by free-lance jockeys
performing services for plaintiff during the period from
~pl'il 1, 1944, to June 30, 1944. Defendant appeals from a
Judgment in favor of plaintiff.
During the period in question plaintiff owned a b'tring
of horses that he raced at Bay Meadows race track. He
engaged free-lance jockeys to ride the horses in various
raccs. They were not in his regular employment but were
engaged separately for each race. In March, 1941, the
California Employment Stabilization Commission ruled that
the free-lance jockeys involved were in "employment" within
~Ie meaning of section 6.5 of the Unemployment Insurance
~. and that any remuneration paid to the jockeys was
. au Jcct to contributions as provided in the act.
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The evidence at the trial related in the main to the customs
and practices of the owners of race horses and the trainers
generally in employing jockeys, and their control over the
jockeys' activities in riding the horses. Plaintiff testi1led that
he had no written agreement or understanding with the
jockeys in question other than a standard form signed by the
jockeys' agents specifying the jockey's name, the race, the
date, and the first and second calla.. There was no other evidence of any specific agreement, written or oral between the
plaintiff and the jockeys whose services are involved in this
case. Neither plaintitI nor defendant introduced any competenat evidence as to the actual control exercised over the
jockeys in question by the plaintiff and his trainer. The
evidence showed that the jockeys, through agents, contracted
with the owners to ride particular horses in particular races.
In accordance with rule 278 of the rules adopted by the Cali·
fornia Horse Racing Board pursuant to chapter 769, Statutes
of 1933, the remuneration for the services of these jockeys
was $35 when they won a race and $15 when they lost. Such
remuneration was received by all jockeys in the absence of
specific contract provisions to the contrary. It was shown
that it is the custom for a jockey to report to the jockey
room with his personal riding equipment at noon on the day
of the race; that he changes into silks furnished by the owner
and then proceeds to the paddock, where he meets with the
owner or trainer. At this time either the owner or the trainer.
acting as the owner's agent. gives instructions 88 to the running of the race and the handling of the horse; but, under
rule 323(a) of the rules of the California Horse Racing Board.
the owner or trainer can give no instructions or orders that
do not have as their objective the winning of the race, unless
the owner has more than one horse entered in the same race.
If the owner or trainer does not wish the horse to be whipped,
he may 80 instruct the jockey, but he cannot enforce such an
instruction unless he has the whip taken from the horse upon
application to the stewards, in which case no whip may be
used on that particular horse until, upon the application of
the owner or trainer. the stewards change the ruling. The
owner must pay the jockey the contract price in the event he
discharges the jockey without cause before the running of the
race. Obviously, neither the owner nor the trainer can dillcharge the jockey while he is engaged in running the race.
After the race, the owner or trainer US\lRI1~' conferR with the
Jockey to ascertain how the horse performed aDd, if the horse

...
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did not do as expected, the rcasons therefor. If it is apparent that the jockey did not follow instructions, the
owner does not engage the jockey to ride again.
[la] There is no conflict in the evidence as to the facts
outlined above, but plaintiff contends that defendant had
the burden of showing the actual control exercised by plaintiff or his trainer over the jockeys in question, and since defendant failed to show that such control was actually exercised, the jockeys were properly held not to be employees. It
is clear. however, that plaintiff made no showing that the
owner or trainer did not exercise, or have the right to exercise. control except in so far as the right to exercise control
was limited by the rules of the California Horse Racing
Board or by the inaccessibility of the jockeys while actively
engaged in the race. The only finding of fact made by the
trial court on the question of employment was a general
finding that during the period in question the free-lance
jockeys engaged by plaintiff were not employees and the compensa,tion paid them consisted of payments to independent
contractors. The basis of this finding is clear from the
memorandum opinion of the trial court. The trial court not
only decided the case on the theory that the actual control
exercised by the particular taxpayer over those performing
services for him determines their relationship but placed the
burden of proof on the defendant commission to show that
control was actual1y exercised. It thus distinguished Drillon
v. Industrial Ace. Com., 17 Ca1.2d 346, 351 [110 P.2d 64],
upholding a determination by the Industrial Accident Commission that free-lance jockeys are employees· within the
.meaning of section 3351 of the Labor Code. The facts in that
case are substantially the same as those in the present case
except that the right to control.was shown by its actual
exercise (cf Connell v. Harris, 23 Cal.App. 537, 542 [138 P.
9491; see 19 A.L.R. 226, 240) rather than by the customs
and practices of the occupation. [2] Clearly. the existence
of a contractual right may be shown by usages and customs.
(See Hind v. Oriental Products Co., Inc., 195 Cal. 655, 667
[235 P. 438).)
[lb] The decision in the Dril10n case was based on the
right of the owner to exercise control over the jockeys (supra,
at 355), the principal test of employment under section 6.5
of thr Fnemplo~'ment Insnrnnec Art (Empire Star Mines Co.
v. California Emp. Com., 28 Ca1.2d 33, 43 [168 P.2d 686]).
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It was held that statutes and administrative regulations designed for public protection, such as the rules of the racing
board, even though they may limit the principal's right of
control, do not remove persons performing services for others
under the protection of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
In the present ca.se the same reasoning is applicable to the
same rule.". (See California Emp. Stab. Com. V. Morris, 28
Ca1.2d 812, 817 [172 P.2d 497].) Hence, the ultimate fact..~
of this case are indistinguishable from those in Drillon v.
Industrial Ace. Com., supra. Even if it is assumed that the
actual exercise of control rather than the right to control
is the crucial element in this case, it clearly is not the law
that the burden of proof is on the taxing authority in an
action by a taxpayer to recover taxes on the ground that
they were illegally assessed. (See United States V. Ander.!on.
269 U.S. 422, 443 [46 S.Ct. 131, 70 L.Ed. 347]; 3 Cooley,
Law of Taxation; 4th ed., § 1307; and see Robinson v. George.
16 Ca1.2d 238. 244 [105 P.2d 914], holding that the bur·
den of proof generally is on the party attaekinll the em·
ployment relationship.)
[3] It cannot seriously be contended that one who is
an employee within the meaning of section 3351 of the
Labor Code (Workmen's Compensation Act) is not fl..ngaged
in "employment" within the meaning of section 6.5 of the
California Unemployment Insurance Act. Section 3351 of
the Labor Code provides that "Employee" means every
person in the service of an employer under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or im·
plied, oral or written. . . ." An employer is defined by
section 3300 of the Labor Code to include "Every person
including any public "ervice corporation, which has any
natural person in service." Section 6.5 of the Unemploy.
ment Insurance Act defines employment as "service . . .
performed for wages or under an,v contract of hire. written
or oral, expre.o;s or implied."
It has been held that the word "employment" as defined in
section 6.5 of the Unemployment Insurance Act does not
include independent contractors. (Briggs v. California Emp.
Com., 28 Ca1.2d 50, 54 [168 P.2d 6961.) In Empire Star
Mines Co. v. California Employment Commission, 28 Cal.2d
33, 43 [168 P.2d 686], this court set forth the rules for the
determination of the question whether or not a person is an
independent contractor or is engaged in employment under

/
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section 6.5. The principal test of the employment relationship was held to be the "right to control over the manner
and means of accomplishing the result desired." Strong
evidence of thiR right is shown by the right of the principal to discharge the worker. The secondary tests are listed
in that opinion as including, "(a) whether or not the one
performing service is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business; (b) the kind of occupation. with reference to
whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the
direction of the principal or by a specialist without super·
vision; (c) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(d) whether the principal or workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the persons doing th('
work; (e) the length of time foJ' which the services are to be
performed; (f) the method of payment, whether by time or
by the job; (g) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the principal: (h) whether or not the partieR believe they are creating the relationship of employer.
employee. (Rest., Agency, § 220; Cal.Ann. § 220_)"
It haR already been observed with regard to the principal
test. that the owner or trainer has the right of control except
in so far as he is limited by the rules of the racing board.
The right to discharge in this case is limited only by the
rule that the owner may not discharge a jockey without
cause unless he pays the contract price. There is no question that the owner may dischar.ge a jockey up to the time
he is out on the track and physically out of his control.
As in any contract of employment for a fixed period, an
employee prematurely discharged without cause may recover damages based on his wages. (W. F. Boardman Co. v.
Petch, 186 Cal. 476. 483. f199 P. 1047]; ct. Drillon v. Industrial Ace. Com., supra, at 354.)
Among the secondary elements of the employment relation,
only three are clearly absent from this case: (c) Jockeys are
. not unskilled workmen; however, many skilled workmen are
employees. (e) Free-lance jockeys are employed for a fixed
period, the duration of one race. (f) The basis of payment
is the race, not the time involved. The other elements are
either present or inapplicable to this case: (a) The occupation is an integral part of the owner's business. (b) The
work is usually performed under the direction of the owner or
trainer to the extent allowed by the rules of the California
Horse Racing Board. (d) Although the jockeys furnishes hh~

)
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personal riding equipment the silb and the horse are fur-·
nished by the owner. (g) The question whether horse racing
is the regular business or occupation of owners of race horses
is immaterial in determining whether jockeys are employees.
The plaintiff made no showing that it WI8 not his regular
occupation and testided that he could not say what his regular
occupation was. (h) The belief of the parties as to the retatioDship created is relevant only to indicate whether or not
there WI8 an 888UDlption of control by the principal and 1JUbmission thereto by the worker. (Rest., Agency, § 220, comment (i).) [4] There WI8 no evidence in regard to the
belief of the parties 88 to their relationship at the time the
services were performed. The belief of the jockeys, however,
that they would not be rehired if they failed to follow instructions is relevant to show their submission to control.
[I] Plaintiff contends that the judgment cannot be reversed, since it is based on a conclusion drawn from the evidence 88 an inference· of fact, not 88 a conclusion of law.
There WI8 no evidence from which the trial court could reasonably have drawn any inference inconsistent with the conclusion that the plaintiff had the right to control the activities
of the jockeys except where he was prevented from doing 80
by the rules of the Racing Board or by the inaccessibility of
the jockeys while they were actively engaged in the race. The
contention that the question whether a person is an employee
under section 6.5 of the Unemployment Insurance Act is
wholly one of fact, even when the evidence is not in conftiet
and not reasonably susceptible of eon1licting inferences, is
untenable. Under such a rule there would be nothing to
prevent con1lieting interpretations of identical facts by the
various trial courts 80 that free-lance jockeys would sometimes be cIassi1led 88 employees and sometimes not. Such
a rule would make effective enforcement of the Unemployment Insurance Act impossible.
In CtJli/of'fl/la Bmp. Stab. Com. v. JlOf'f'il, 28 Cal.2d 812,
818 (172 P.2d 497], this court, applying the same rule as that
applied in the Drillon case, npra, held that the Real Estate
Act in 80 far as it regulates real estate salesmen for the protection of the public is not relevant to the question whether sueh
salesmen are employees under section 6.5 of the California Unemployment Insurance Act. The court stated that II. • • the
occupation of real estate salesmen, in 80 far as the Unemployment Insurance Act is concerned, is one that may be classified

)
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as that of an employee, or an independent contractor, depending upon the facts of the particular case." Clearly this
statement does not mean that the trial courts of the state can
conclude that, under section 6.5, one real estate salesman is
an employee while another operating under identical facts is
not. It means that whether a particular type of real estate
salesman is within the purview of the act depends on the
facts involved in the relationship between such salesmen
and their principals rather than on some statute that has
no relation to unemployment insurance.
The result of the application of the rules of law set forth
in Empire Star Mines Co. v. California Emp. Com., supra,
will depend in any particular case on the essential facts of
that case. Thus, in California Emp. Com. v. Bates, 24 Ca1.2d
432, 436 [150 P.2d 192], the judgment of the trial court was
reversed because the conclusion of the trial court from the
facts was inconsistent with the decision in California Emp.
Com. v. Los Angeles Down Town Shopping News Corp., 24
Ca1.2d 421, 425 [150 P.2d 186], where the facts were substantially the same. This holding is in accord with the rule,
particularly applicable to public law cases where uniformity
of decision is important, that if the essential facts are not in
conflict the question of the legal relations arising therefrom
is a question of law. (Leis v. City and County of San Francisco, 213 Cal. 256, 258 [2 P.2d 26] j San Diego Trust &
Savings Bank v. San Diego County, 16 Ca1.2d 142, 153 [105
P.2d 94, 133 A.L.R. 416].)
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
EDMONDS, J.-In my opinion, the decision in this case
departs from the established rule that the judgment of the
trial court will not be disturbed if there. is substantial
evidence to support its determination. Giving' full effect to
the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn
from it, the finding that an independent contractor relationship existed between the owner and the jockeys should be
upheld. As stated by the trial judge in his memorandum
of opinion, "there is sufficient evidence in the record to
establish the fact that the jockeys in question were independent contractors although the evidence is in dispute."

)
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I agree that the burden of establishing an independent
contractor relationship is upon the party attacking the determination of employment (see Industrial Ind. Exch. v.
Industrial Acc. Com., 26 Ca1.2d 130, 136 [156 P.2d 926]).
Quite evidently that rule was followed in the trial of this case,
and, in any event, this court may not rely upon an error of
law found in a memorandum of opinion as a basis for reversal.
(DeCou v. Howell, 190 Cal. 741 [214 P. 444]; see Witkin.
New Rules on Appeal, 17 So.Cal.L.Rev. 109.)
A jockey, ealled as a witness in behalf of Isenberg, testified, "I think the procedure is, that if an owner is willing
to pay a rider his fee, that he can substitute a rider." This
was in answer to the question as to whether it was "possible
for . . . [the jockey] . . . to be removed from that mount
without the horse being taken out of the raee'" As indicated by other testimony of this witness, he was not necessarily referring to the rules of the Racing Board, and it
reas6nab1y may be inferred that in his statement as to "the
procedure" he was referring to the agreement of the parties
of the national custom.
There was also evidence from which it re&SODI\bly could be
inferred that the jockeys were not required to follow instructions given them. One jockey testified that "His trainer
Eii>metimes gave . . . [him] ••. instructions how he thought
a horse would run best." But, he added: "They [owner and
trainer] have suggested ways of riding them [horses]: I
wouldn't say they told me just how to ride them. That is
impossible." As to whether or not such instructions were
followed, he testified, "Well. if I found out that the horse
wasn't running under those instructions, I would try some
other means of getting him to run." This witness also testified that the owner "may leave it up to your own judgment"
as to manner in which the jockey should ride. When a.~ked
whether he used his own judgment when riding a race,
he replied : "Yes, you· have to use your own judgment. Instructions are followed only when you don't figure in your
own judgment that they hinder the chances of winning."
It is the well settled rule that when there is a conflict in the
evidence, including not only objective facts but also the
inferences which reasonably may be deduced therefrom, the
determination of the trial oourt, in regard to the legal relationship of the parties to a controversy, will not be dis. turbed. (California Emp. Stab. Com. v. Norins Realty Co.,
i 29 Oal.2d 419 [175 P.2d 217); California Emp. Stab. Com. v•

•

)

I

May 1947]

ISENBERG V. CALIFORNIA

BMP. STAB.

COM.

43

[30 C.2ci 34; 180 P.2d II]

Morris, 28 Ca1.2d 81l! [172 P.2d 497); Twentieth etc. Lites
v. California Dept. Emp., 28 Ca1.2d 56 [168 P.2d 699];
Briggs v. California Emp. Com., 28 Ca1.2d 50 [168 P.2d
696]; Empire Star Mines Co. v. California Emp. Com., 28
Ca1.2d 33 [168 P.2d 686].) And although strong evidence in
support of an employment relationship is the right to discharge at will, without cause, the fact that a person's services
may not be so terminated justifies the finding of an independent contractor relationship (B1'iggs v. California Emp.
Com., supra, p. 54; Empire Star Mines Co. v. California
Emp. Com., supra, p. 45).
The testimony quoted clearly warrants a conclusion of lack
of control, and there i8 other evidence which supports the
t.rial court's determination. The jockey furnished most of
his own equipment. The method of payment was by the race,
not according to the time involved. Jockeys are skilled workers and are employed for a fi."{ed period, the duration of the
race. Giving no effect to the rules of the Racing Board, the
trial court had ample ground for deciding that an independent contractor relationship existed between the owner
and the jockeys. Evidence that, by cnstom, the owner or
trainer had the right to give instructions to the jockey,
merely raised a conflict in the evidence which was resolved
by the trier of fact. Furthermore, the rules of the Racing
Board limit the right of the owner and trainer to control
the activities of the jockeys and. therefore, support the finding of an independent contractor relationship.
Neither California Emp. Stab. Com. v. Morris, supra, nor
Drillon v. Industrial Acc. Com., 17 Ca1.2d 346 [110 P.2d 64],
is inconsistent with this conclusion. In the Morris case, the
trial court found that certain real estate salesmen were independent contractors. Upon appeal from the judgment, the
commission contended that the Real Estate Act gave a broker
the right to control a salesman in certain ways and, thet'cfore,
as a matter of law, and regardless of a. trial court's finding,
all real estate salesmen were employees. Rejecting this contention, the court held that there was evidence to support the
finding of the lack of control, and the proyisions of the Real
Estate Act did not compel a contrary determination. In the
Drillon case, the Industrial Accident Commission decided
that certain jockeys were employees. As requiring a reversal
of the judgment, the taxpa~'er relied upon the rules of the
Racing Board which restrict the rir--ht of an owner and
trainer to control the activities of'a jockey. These rules, it
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was urged, establish, as a matter of law, that a jockey is
an independent contractor. But the court refused to so
construe them, and held that the evidence supported the
trial court's determination.
These cases are clearly distinguishable from the situation
presented in the record now under review. Here the trier of
fact determined that the jockeys who rode Isenberg's horses
were independent contractors. The commission attacks the
decision upon the ground that the only evidence in the record
which supports the trial court's i'uding of lack of control is
the limitations found in the rules of the Racing Board. The
issue in this regard, therefore, is whether the rules may be
used to 8tlpport a finding of the trial court. In the Morris
and Drillon cases, the question was whether, when there is
evidence to support the finding of the trial court or commission, may the rules of the Racing Board or the regulatory
provisions of the Real Estate Act be invoked to compel a
determination contrary to those findings. Both the Morris
and the Drillon eases hold that the eifect of such rules or
regulations is, at most, to set up a conflict in the evidence:
they may not be used to require findings contrary to those
made by the trial court upon substantial evidence.
Also, I do not agree with the strong implication in the
majority opinion that the determination of the legal relationship is primarily a question of law. This implication is found
in the reference to the Workmen's Compensation Act, the
holding, in eifeet, that the Drillon case controls the disposition
of the present controversy, and the direction that judgment
be entered in favor of the commission. Moreover, the ease.'1 of
California Emp. Com.. v. Los Angeles Down Town Skopp~ng
News Corp., 24 Cal.2d 421 [150 P.2d 186], and California
Emp. Com. v. Bates, 24 Ca1.2d 432 f150 P.2d 192]. are cited
as standing for the proposition that whether persons are inde·
pendent contractors or employees is, in eifect. a question of
law. On the contrary, in the 1irst of these cases the decision
was based upon the proposition that "there is substantial
evidence to support the findings of the trial court that the
boys were employees within the meaning of the Unemployment Insurance Act. • . ." The ground of decision in the
Bates ease was that there was no substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding of an independent contractor
relationship. This is quite different from the present statement that the judgment in favor of Bates "was reversed because the conclusion of the trial court from the facta was
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inconsistent with the decision in California Employment
Commission v. L. A. Shopping News Corporation, 24 Ca1.2d
421, 425 [150 P.2d 186], where the facts were substantially the same."
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-I agree with the views expressed by Mr. Justice Edmonds. I am thoroughly cognizant
of the (at least to the involved agencies) administrative desirability of having a simple, absolute, and universal or rule of
thumb method for clas.<iifying entire industrial or professional
groups as employees or nonemployees. But that desirability
certainly does not warrant this court in departing from constitutional standards. Is it the intention of the majority of this
court to hold that a!l a matter of law all jockeys who ride
horse for compensation, regardless of the more specific terms
of their several contracts, are employees' If that is not the
effect of the holding its avowed object is not attained. If that
is the effect of the holding it means that stable owners and
riders no longer are permitted the freedom of mutually contracting such reciprocal relationships as they may agree upon.
No longer do they have the right or capacity to establISh the
character of their obligations to each other. No matter how
specific may be the terms by which they agree that the rider
is a skilled specialist, that he shall furnish his own equipment,
that he shall undertake a single project to be performed in his
own way without any supervision or direction of the owner,
the result will be the same as though the converse of all
those heretofore material elements were substituted.
It is difficult for me to believe that the majority actually
subscribe to the doctrine above indicated. But if they do not
subscribe to it then not only do they fail to achieve the assertedly desirable objective of administrative universality but the
only other rational basis for their holding in this case is
equally disturbing It means not that there shall be uniformity in classifying all jockeys as employees but that the
majority have weighed the evidence in this one case and have
themselves elected to draw inferences contrary to those drawn
by the trial court. The evidence related by MI'. Justice
Edmonds is in the record. It admits of the inferences suggested by him. Those inferences support the trial court's
judgment. The functions of trial and appellate courts are

)
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constitutionally disparate and no rule should be more scrupulously observed by courts of appeal than that in their appel1ate
work they should not encroach upon or usurp a trial court
function. The resolution of factual questionR including the
determination of the inferences to be drawn from the evidenc
whether that evidence be documentary or undisputed or other
wise, is in a major sense exclusively the province of the trial
court (or of the jury). It is exclusive in the trial court (or
jury) in the sense that the appellate court is given no right to
resolve factual con:6icts or to indulge its preference as to the
selection of inferences from the evidence. It is only where
elearly there is no substantial evidence from which essential
inferences can be drawn that the appellate court may properly interfere in a factual sense; and its interference then
mould be both in form and in substance by a statement of the
law, not a declaration of fact. Any other course by an appellate court is dictatorial in nature and tends toward depriving litigants of the constitutional standards of a fair trial.
The principles involved in this case are markedly similar
to those in Cardillo v. Liberly Mut1UJl 1M. CO. (1947), U.S. [67 S.Ct. 801. 91 L.Ed. -J. There the eritieal
question was whether the injury was one "arising out of and
in the course of employment." In a proceeding before the
commissioner nnder the District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act it had been found that the injury which resulted
in the decedent's death· had 80 arisen and an award was made
to the widow. The employer and in.'lUrance carrier brought
action in the district court to annn! the award; they contended
that there was "a lack of substantial evidence" to support the
essential finding. The district court held that the findin.gs
"were supported by evidence in the record" but the Court
of Appeals· reversed. The Supreme Court in reversing the
Court of Appeals and reinstating the judgment of the district
court said: (pp. 806-807 of 67 S.Ct.) "In determining whether
a particular injury arose out of and in the course of employment, the Deputy Commissioner must necessarily draw an
inference from what he has fonnd to be the basic facta. • • •
If supported by evidence and not inconsistent with the law,
the Deputy Commissioner's inference that an injury did or
did not arise out of and in the course of employment is eonelusive. No reviewing court can then set aside that inference
because the opposite one is thought to be more reasonable; nor
ea:A the opposite inference be substituted by the court because
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of a belief that the one chosen by the Deputy Commissioner
is factually questionable. Voehl v. lndemnity Ins. Co., supra
[288 U.S.], 166 [53 S.Ct. 380, 77 L.Ed. 678, 87 A.L.R. 245];
Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280, 287 [56 S.Ct. 190, 80
L.Ed. 229J; South Chicago Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 257258 [60 S.Ct. 544, 84 L.Ed. 732]; Parker v. Motor Boat Sales,
3]4 U.S. 244, 246 [62 S.Ct. 221, 86 L.Ed. 184]; Davis v. Department of Labor, supra [317 U.S.], 256 [63 S.Ct. 225, 87
L.Ed.250].
"It matters not that the basic facts from which the Deputy
Commissioner draws this inference are undisputed rather than
contro,'erted. See Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287, 293
[66 S.Ct. 120, 90 L.Ed. 78, 166 A.L.R. 708]. It is likewise
immaterial that the facts permit the drawing of diverse inferences. The Deputy Commissioner alone is charged with the
duty of initially selecting the inference which seems most reasonable and his choice, if otherwise sustainable, may not be
disturbed by a reviewing court. Del Vecchio v. Bowers, supra
[296 U.S.], 287 [56 S.Ct. 190. 80 L.Ed. 233]. Moreover, the
fact that the inference of the type here made by the Deputy
Commissioner involves an application of a broad statutory
term or phrase to a slJeci(ic set of facts gives rise to no greater
scope of judicial review. Labor Board v. Hearst Publications,
322 U.S. 111, 131 [64 S.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed. 1170]; Commissioner v. Scottish American Co., 323 U.S. 119, 124 [65 S.Ct.
169, 89 L.Ed. 113]; Unemployment Compensation Commission v. Aragan, 329 U.S. 143 r67 S.Ct. 245, 91 L.Ed. --].
Even if such an inference be considered more legal than factual in nature, the reviewing court's function is exhausted
when it becomes evident that the Deputy Commissioner's
choice has substantial roots in the evidence and is not forbidden by the law." (Italics added.)
Again, in an action which originated in a state court under
the Federal Employers Liability Act (35 StatS. 65, as amended,
45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.) and which was before the United States
Supreme Court on certiorari after the state Supreme Court
had reversed a trial court "for insufficiency of evidence to
show negligence," the high scourt said (Ellis v. Union Pacific
Railroad Co. (1947), 329 U.S. 649 [67 S.Ct. 598, 600, 91
L.Ed. --]) "The choice of conflicting versions of the way
the accident happened, the decision as to which witness was
telling the truth, the inferences to be draH'n from uncontroverted as well as controverted facts, at'e questions for the
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jury. Tennant v. Peoria ct P. U. B. Co., 321 U.S. 29 [64
S.Ct. 409, 88 L.Ed. 520); Lavender v. Kurn, supra [327 U.S.
645 (66 S.Ct. 740, 90 L.Ed. 916).] Once there is a reason.
able basis in the record for concluding that there was negli.
gence which caused the injury, it is irrelevant that fail'.
minded men might reach a different conclusion. For then it
would be an invasion of the jury's function for an appellate
court to draw contrary inferences or to conclude that a dif.
ferent con('lusion would be more reasonable." (Italics added.)
To the same effect is EagZes v. United States ex rel Samuels
(1946), 329 U.S. 304 [67 S.Ct. 313, 91 L.Ed. - ] (the
case of a selective service registrant seeking to evade service
as a theological student), where the court, in recognizing the
force of that class of practical evidence which so often appears
to the fact finder but which cannot be reflected in a phonographic record, said: "A registrant might seek a theological
school as a refuge for the duration of the war. Congress did
not create the exemption . . . for him. There was some evi.
dence that this was Samuels' plan; and that evidence, coupled
with his demeanor and attitude, might have seemed more per.
suasive to the boards than it does in the cold record. Out'
inquiry is ended when we are unable to say that the board
flouted the command of Congress in denying Samuels the ex·
emption." (Italics added.) See, also, Estate of Bristol
(1943), 23 Ca1.2d 221, 223 [143 P.2d 689].
For the reasons above set forth I would affirm the judg.
ment of the trial court.
.

